

The Portable Updates Lightweight Library

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Outline

- Introduction to the Internet of Things;
- Internet of Things Security;
- Software Updates;
- Software Updates for Constrained Devices;

What is the IoT?

- The network of identifiable actuators and sensors connected to the Internet with the goal to create a connected and fluid world;
- Every object could becoming smart and connected;
- Expected 26 Billion Units By 2020;

Where is the IoT?

- Wearable;
- Smart cities;
- Smart homes;
- Transports;
- Health care;
- ...










What is the IoT, really?

A computer included into an object.

User's Perception



User's Perception



Vendor's Perception



Vendor's Perception



How does the IoT perception impact security?





The S in IoT stands for Security


Attacks to IoT

July 2017, Attacker Uses Smart Fish Tank to Steal Casino Data



Attacks from IoT

October 2016: Mirai botnet performed huge DDoS



Many others:

- Persirai;
- Imeij;
- Amnesia;
- Reaper;
- ...
- BrickerBot

Change of Perspective

We need to rethink the current IoT paradigm, shifting from considering IoT devices as simple objects with some integrated smart feature to treat them as computers which do specific jobs.

IoT security

- Many challenges to solve IoT security. One of them is software updates.
- Many IoT devices have unpatched vulnerabilities;
 - Vendors did not included an update system;
 - Vendors included an update system but did not send software updates;
 - Users do not secured or updated them correctly;

Software Updates

Why?

Introduce new features

Fix implementation bugs

Fix security vulnerabilities

How?

Locally

Over the Air

Software Updates System

Not a new challenge...


Computer



Smartphones



Automotive



Internet of Things



Fiat Chrysler recalls 1.4 million cars after Jeep hack http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33650491

Constrained or not?

Constrained Devices



Non Constrained Device



Constrained Devices

- Devices with very limited:
 - Memory;







- Energy;
- Network bandwidth;








Standardized in RFC 7228.

Portable Updates Ligthweight Library

github.com/libpull/libpull



Libpull


- Library for performing updates for Class 1 constrained devices, with ~100 kB of ROM and ~10 kB of RAM;
- It is not an update system, but provides all the functions to create an update system;
- Very different from standard updates. The need to have:
 - Very small memory footprint;
 - Very low energy consumption;
 - Interact with low level details (no OS abstractions);

Libpull


- It is designed to solve three main requirements:
 - Security requirements;
 - Portability requirements;
 - Platform constraints requirements.

The update system can easily move from being a security feature to a security vulnerability if not designed and implemented correctly


Double Server Architecture & Signature;




Double Server Architecture & Signature;



- Double Server Architecture & Signature;
- Device manifest validation;



- Double Server Architecture & Signature;
- Device manifest validation;
- Digital signature;



IoT Goes Nuclear: Creating a ZigBee Chain Reaction

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
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Abstract—Within the next few years, billions of loT devices will densely populate our cities. In this paper we describe a new type of threat in which adjacent loT devices will infect each other with a worm that will rapidly spread over large areas, provided that the density of compatible loT devices exceeds a certain critical mass. In particular, we developed and verified such an infection using the popular Philips Hue smart lamps as a platform. The worm spreads by jumping directly from one lamp to its neighbors, using only their built-in ZigBee wireless connectivity and their physical proximity. The attack can start by plugging in a single infected bulb anywhere in the city, and then catastrophically spread everywhere within minutes. It enables the attacker to turn all the city lights on or off, to permanently brick them, or to exploit them in a massive DDOS attack. To demonstrate the risks involved, we

the next five years more than fifty billion "things" will be connected to the internet. Most of them will be cheaply made sensors and actuators which are likely to be very insecure. The potential dangers of the proliferation of vulnerable IoT devices had just been demonstrated by the massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on the Dyn DNS company, which exploited well known attack vectors such as default passwords and the outdated TELNET service to take control of millions of web cameras made by a single Chinese manufacturer [1].

In this paper we describe a much more worrying situation: We show that without giving it much thought, we are going to populate our homes, offices, and neighborhoods with a dense network of billions of tiny transmitters and receivers that have ad-hoc networking capabilities. These IoT devices can directly talk to each other, creating a




- Double Server Architecture & Signature;
- Device manifest validation;
- Digital signature;
- Safe Key Storage;

Hardware Security Modules





Libpull General Architecture



Goals of the Project

- Reduce costs of including an update system into constrained devices;
- Being a portable and suitable solution for Class 1 devices, but usable also on more powerful devices;
- Supporting standards targeting constrained devices;



Future Works

- Support other hardware and software platforms;
- Support OMA LWM2M for device management;
- Integrate delta updates to improve energy efficiency;





